Alireza soleimani biography examples

Abstract

5-fluorouracil (5-FU) is among the mostly administrated chemotherapeutic agents for a wide variety of neoplasms. Non-coding RNAs have a central impact on the determination of the response of patients to 5-FU. These transcripts via modulation of cancer-related pathways, cell apoptosis, autophagy, epithelial–mesenchymal transition, and other aspects of cell behavior can affect cell response to 5-FU. Modulation of expression levels of microRNAs or long non-coding RNAs may be a suitable approach to sensitize tumor cells to 5-FU treatment via modulating multiple biological signaling pathways such as Hippo/YAP, Wnt/β-catenin, Hedgehog, NF-kB, and Notch cascades. Moreover, there is an increasing interest in targeting these transcripts in various kinds of cancers that are treated by 5-FU. In the present article, we provide a review of the function of non-coding transcripts in the modulation of response of neoplastic cells to 5-FU.

Keywords: lncRNA, miRNA, fluorouracil, expression, biomarker

Introduction

5-fluorouracil (5-FU) and its oral prodrugs including S1 and capecitabine (1) are among the main components of most chemotherapeutic regimens whose efficiencies have been established in the treatment of several neoplasms such as head and neck squamous cell carcinoma (SCC) (2), gastrointestinal SCC and adenocarcinoma (ADC) (3, 4), and SCC of the uterine cervix (5). This agent was introduced by Heidelberger et al. during the 1950s (6). Afterward, it has been increasingly used during the last decades and remained as the backbone of most of chemotherapy regimens. 5-FU has also been used in combination with novel cancer therapies especially targeted therapeutics including vascular endothelial growth factor (VEGF) inhibitors [bevacizumab (7), ziv-aflibercept (8), regorafenib (9) and ramucirumab (10)] and anti-epidermal growth factor receptor (EGFR) therapies [cetuximab (11) and panitumumab (12)]. The cytotoxic effect of 5-FU is mainly induced through inhibition o

After taking command, Suleimani strengthened relationships in Lebanon, with Mughniyeh and with Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah’s chief. By then, the Israeli military had occupied southern Lebanon for sixteen years, and Hezbollah was eager to take control of the country, so Suleimani sent in Quds Force operatives to help. “They had a huge presence—training, advising, planning,” Crocker said. In 2000, the Israelis withdrew, exhausted by relentless Hezbollah attacks. It was a signal victory for the Shiites, and, Crocker said, “another example of how countries like Syria and Iran can play a long game, knowing that we can’t.”

Since then, the regime has given aid to a variety of militant Islamist groups opposed to America’s allies in the region, such as Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. The help has gone not only to Shiites but also to Sunni groups like Hamas—helping to form an archipelago of alliances that stretches from Baghdad to Beirut. “No one in Tehran started out with a master plan to build the Axis of Resistance, but opportunities presented themselves,” a Western diplomat in Baghdad told me. “In each case, Suleimani was smarter, faster, and better resourced than anyone else in the region. By grasping at opportunities as they came, he built the thing, slowly but surely.”

In the chaotic days after the attacks of September 11th, Ryan Crocker, then a senior State Department official, flew discreetly to Geneva to meet a group of Iranian diplomats. “I’d fly out on a Friday and then back on Sunday, so nobody in the office knew where I’d been,” Crocker told me. “We’d stay up all night in those meetings.” It seemed clear to Crocker that the Iranians were answering to Suleimani, whom they referred to as “Haji Qassem,” and that they were eager to help the United States destroy their mutual enemy, the Taliban. Although the United States and Iran broke off diplomatic relations in 1

Abstract: The key mission of the Quds Force of the Revolutionary Guards (IRGC) is to defend the Iranian Islamic Revolution and create armed militias in the countries of its “Axis of Resistance.” Its organization is opaque and complex, coordinating combat operations with soft-power actions aimed at, among other initiatives, establishing a Pax Irania in the Middle East, a ‘peace’ of which it is the initiator and guarantor. Although the Quds Force’s apparatus in Syria has been under pressure from Israeli airstrikes, Tehran is sticking to its mission set: infiltrating Syrian civil society and sending fighters to the north, where the civil war will one day end, and to the south, on the edge of the Golan Heights, to establish a base against Israel if necessary.

Irregular warfare—a deliberately asymmetric approach to the enemy to surprise and destabilize—is not just a tactic in Iranian military doctrine; it is also an established operational model of the “Islamic Revolution.” The day after taking power, the regime set up a “headquarters for irregular warfare,” which it used against its enemy then, Iraq. From the start, the aim was to have a force on the fringes of a conventional force, offering a wide range of interventions: combat, intelligence, special operations, and soft power, among others.

The IRGC was born out of the desire to protect the gains of the Islamic Revolution against internal and external enemies and to export the ideology of the regime, whatever the means and modus operandi. Mostly confined, in terms of external operations, to southern Lebanon and a few operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the years following its establishment after the 1979 revolution that overthrew the Shah of Iran, it became, during the Syrian civil war, a textbook case illustrating Iran’s expansionist strategy.

To understand the IRGC is to understand the deeper realities of the regime. Before being killed in a U.S. strike, the then Quds Force commander Majo